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1 INTRODUCTION1
The introduction of ‘making work pay’ policies, directly subsidizing the
net income from work, has resulted in a certain convergence between the
continental European welfare states and the Anglo-Saxon liberal welfare
states. In the Anglo-Saxon countries, where labour markets are highly
deregulated, low-wage jobs are common. Instead of improving the
incomes of low wage earners through minimum wages, wage subsidies for
families on a low earned income has been the main strategy. For example
in Canada, ‘back to work bonuses’ such as the Canadian Self-Suﬃciency
Project (SSP), target an earnings supplement for working single parents
who have been on welfare. Tax credits such as the Working Tax Credit
(WTC) in the United Kingdom (UK) and the Earned Income Tax Credit
(EITC) in the United States (US) have developed into the principal tools
for social policy in these countries (OECD, 2000). These policies have been
considered as a great success in these countries, as they have contributed
to an increase in employment and a reduction of poverty (see Meyer and
Rosenbaum, 1999; Blank et al, 1999; Duncan and MacCrea, 1999; Brewer
et al, 2001). Given their success, countries in continental Europe are begin-
ning to see these measures as the solution for the trade-oﬀ between work
and poverty.
Arrangements whereby the net wages of low-paid workers are neverthe-
less subsidized are ‘alien’ to the traditional Continental and Scandinavian
European welfare state. An important objective has always been to guar-
antee decent (minimum) wage levels, with fairly universal coverage often
determined through collective wage bargaining. Historically two important
goals of the minimum wage have been to provide workers with a ‘fair’ com-
pensation for their work eﬀort and to raise the standard of living of low
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paid workers and their family. The advantages of high minimum wages are
that they avert the danger of unemployment traps and working poverty by
guaranteeing that even low paid jobs are ﬁnancially more attractive than
unemployment (Dolado et al, 2000).
In recent years, however, several European countries introduced making
work pay policies, which raised net incomes for low wage earners in order
to raise work incentives at the bottom of the labour market. There is no
single instrument to make work pay (European Commission, 2003;
OECD, 2003a). Work incentives can be stimulated by combining a (partly)
unemployment/social assistance beneﬁt with a work income (eg Belguim,
France, Portugal). Another instrument is the reduction of social security
employee contributions for low wages in order to raise net wages (eg in
Germany the mini and midi-jobs, in Belgium the ‘reduced employee’s
social contribution on low wages’). Other countries introduced tax reduc-
tions, often for low and moderate work income (eg Denmark). Following
the Anglo-Saxon example several countries introduced tax credits, which
were mostly part of a broader tax reform (France, the ‘Prime Pour
l’Emploi’ or PPE in 2001; the Netherlands, the Employment Tax Credit
(ETC) in 2001). Belgium has also experimented with this instrument: it
introduced a ‘Low Wage Tax Credit’ in 2002 with its recent personal
income tax reform (OECD, 2000; Cantillon et al, 2003), but abolished it
again in January 2005.
In this chapter we present an explorative analysis of the employment
and income eﬀects of the introduction of this tax credit experiment for
low wages in Belgium. For this purpose we compare the Belgian measure
with the tax credits that are applied in the US and the UK. The conti-
nental Belgian version and the Anglo-Saxon version show important
diﬀerences. In Section 2 of this chapter we provide some background
information on the diﬀerent socio-economic situation in Belgium, being
a proto-type of a continental welfare state, and the UK and US being rep-
resentative for the Anglo-Saxon type of welfare states. In Section 3 we
situate the Belgian low wage tax credit within the total of ‘making work
pay’ policies in Belgium and we present the global impact of these recent
Belgian policies on the unemployment trap. In Section 4 we describe the
Belgian and the Anglo-Saxon versions of the tax credit. Moreover we
discuss some ﬁndings from empirical research with respect to the impact
of the tax credits on employment, poverty and income mobility. Section 5
starts with a description of the methodology used, ie a static tax-beneﬁt
model. We then present the results of our calculations, comparing the
introduction of the Belgian Low Wage Tax Credit with that of the Anglo-
Saxon counterparts in a Belgian context. Section 7 ﬁnally concludes our
ﬁndings.
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2 BELGIUM AS A PROTO-TYPE OF A
CONTINENTAL WELFARE STATE VERSUS THE
UK AND THE US AS REPRESENTATIVE FOR A
LIBERAL WELFARE STATE
In order to understand the design of policy instruments in various coun-
tries – in our analysis the tax credit systems in Belgium, the UK and the
US – it is important to understand the broader socio-economic diﬀerences
of countries, being a reﬂection of various social policies. In his well-known
typologie Esping–Andersen (1990) classiﬁes Belgium, together with France
and Germany as a continental welfare state, while the US and the UK are
classiﬁed under the liberal welfare state type. Continental welfare states
diﬀer from liberal welfare states in the degree of employment protection (eg
minimum wages), generosity of the welfare state and in the institutional-
ized power of the social partners.
Without having the ambition to make here an exhaustive analysis, there
are three remarkable diﬀerences between Belgium and the Anglo-Saxon
countries. First, the performance of the Belgian labour market is dis-
appointing. The average employment rate (60 per cent of the population
aged 15–64 in work) in Belgium is much lower than in the two Anglo-
Saxon countries; the gap between the US and the UK is more than 10
percentage points (OECD Employment Outlook, 2004). Secondly,
Belgian social expenditure is much higher compared to the UK and in
particular the US. In Belgium, such as in other continental welfare states,
the level of beneﬁt dependency is high. According to OECD calcula-
tions the number of beneﬁt dependent persons as a percentage of the
15–64 population in 1999 amounted to respectively 29.6 per cent in
Belgium compared to 18.9 per cent in the UK and 13.7 per cent in the US
(OECD, 2003b).
Thirdly, the Belgian income distribution is more equal than the Anglo-
Saxon ones. If we look at the ratio minimum/median2 wage for the Anglo-
Saxon countries in 2000, we ﬁnd that the minimum wage for full-time
employees is much more below median wage than in Belgium (0.364 for
the US, 0.417 for the UK against 0.492 in Belgium). Due to this high
income inequality, the Anglo-Saxon countries have to deal with a larger
group of ‘working poor’. The main social problem in liberal welfare states
is poverty. At the end of the 1990s poverty in the US was 17 per cent
against 8 per cent in Belgium (Förster and Pellizari, 2000). Poverty is a
lesser problem in Belgium because of more generous social beneﬁts and
(minimum) wage levels.
Since the late 1990s unemployment traps are perceived in Belgium as an
important barrier to an increased labour market participation for low paid
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workers. Since the personal income tax reform of 2001, unemploy-
ment traps have been reduced. However, net replacement rates,3
which amount to about 90 per cent for lone parents and couple bread-
winners (on maximum beneﬁt), remain high (De Lathouwer and
Bogaerts, 2002).
This variety in socio-economic context between the countries explains
the diﬀerences in purpose and set-up of the tax credits between Belgium
and the Anglo-Saxon countries. Tax credits for low wages have a double
purpose, namely (1) to make work more attractive and (2) to reduce poverty
for low income families. In the Anglo-Saxon welfare states, the tax credit is
most important for reducing poverty because of the high incidence of low
pay jobs and large income diﬀerences in these countries. For Belgium,
the Low Wage Tax Credit was installed to reduce unemployment traps.
Hence the assumption was that an increase in ﬁnancial incentives would
bring down beneﬁt dependency and consequently increase labour market
participation. This measure was introduced against the background of the
European Union (EU) Employment Strategy, which puts considerable
pressure on European governments to increase their employment rates to
70 per cent towards 2010.
3 TAX CREDITS AS AN INSTRUMENT OF
‘MAKING WORK PAY’ POLICIES
In the European Employment Strategy ‘making work pay’ policies are a
key issue for reducing beneﬁt dependency and increasing labour market
participation. The importance of making work pay policies (MWP) is
underlined by the speciﬁc Guideline eight of the Employment guidelines.
This guideline mainly addresses ﬁnancial incentives to encourage men and
women to seek, take up and remain in work (European Commission,
2003). Several welfare states have introduced income arrangements aimed
at ‘making work pay’. In principle, two policy answers to increase ﬁnancial
incentives are possible: either beneﬁts are lowered or net income from low
paid work is increased. In particular, since the 1990s, various continental
welfare states have followed the latter policy line by directly subsidizing
low wage earners. Such a policy of ‘in-work’ arrangements can take
various forms, eg complementary social beneﬁts to work, reductions of
employee’s social contributions or tax credits.4 These new income arrange-
ments entail a stronger integration between social, employment and tax
policies. The underlying rationale is that it is better to take an active
approach to income arrangements, ie to pay people for working rather
than for inactivity.
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A strong consensus has been reached in the Belgian Welfare State that
structural underemployment should be alleviated without allowing poverty
to increase. Hence, activation and MWP policies are combined with work
subsidizing. Reducing the generosity of social protection (deregulation)
and, in doing so, boosting the ﬁnancial incentives to accept a regular low
paid job, is avoided in Belgium as it would have severe consequences in
terms of poverty. Although in the 1980s and 90s beneﬁt levels stagnated
under pressure of a worsening of public ﬁnances, unemployment traps were
not fought by lowering nominal beneﬁt levels.
3.1 Combating Structural Underemployment without increasing
Poverty: Social Security as a Key Policy Instrument
The main strategy in Belgium and in other continental welfare states
(France and Germany) to combat structural underemployment without
increasing poverty has been through reforms in social security ﬁnancing.
These reforms have been primarily demand-driven, by reducing employers
social contributions in order to reduce the (indirect) wage cost of hiring
workers. There is a big debate going on regarding the net employment eﬀects
and the concrete modalities of reduced employers social contributions.
Evaluation literature on the impact of subsidized job creation on aggregate
employment suggests that the net employment eﬀects are much weaker than
what one might expect theoretically because of displacement, substitution
and dead-weight eﬀects (Marx, 2001; De Koning and Mosley, 2001).
Since the early 1990s, a more supply oriented policy has been pursued,
although demand-driven policies were never abandoned. The focus has
shifted to the necessity for the unemployed to gain work experience and the
need to provide greater ﬁnancial incentives (de Lathouwer and Marx, 2005).
In the late 1990s, the debate on the unemployment trap came high on the
political agenda in Belgium. Measures were taken to create greater ﬁnancial
incentives for the unemployed, but the broader objective was to make work
more ﬁnancially attractive in general. An important strategy to increase net
wages is the reduction of employees’ social contributions on low wages.5 This
scheme started in January 2000 and consists in a ﬁxed sum (€95 since June
2003) that is gradually decreased as the wage increases, up to a maximum
level. Since then, the ﬁnancial advantages of this scheme have been gradu-
ally improved. According to estimates, about 630 000 workers are beneﬁting
from this measure. The budgetary cost is substantial: it increased from an
estimated €96 million in 2001 (before the extension) to €165 million in 2003
(after the extension) (Ministry of Social Aﬀairs, 2003). This cost implies an
important income loss for the social security system. Moreover, it has
caused a shift from proportional social contributions to progressive social
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contributions. This enhances the solidarity principle of social security and
weakens the insurance nature of the system. Trade unions are opposed to
such reforms, arguing that under an insurance-based scheme all employees
should pay contributions (even if the link between beneﬁts and contri-
butions has become weak). Clearly, social contributions legitimize the
important role that trade unions play within the management and the imple-
mentation of continental social security systems.
3.2 From Social Security Towards Tax Credits: a Closer Integration
between Social and Tax Policies
As the approach of reducing employees’ contributions has its limits, due
to the insurance principle and the lack of alternative ﬁnancing, increasing
net wages for low-wage earners has been an explicit objective in the general
tax reform of 2001. Besides a general tax reduction for all income groups,
an individual refundable low wage tax credit was introduced for low-paid
individuals (see the next section for more details). This basic tax credit can
be complemented with tax credits for children,6 which however are applic-
able to all citizens and not to low-wage earners only. From 1 January 2005,
the low wage tax credit was however abolished and replaced by the ‘work-
bonus’. This is, in fact, an elaboration of the reduction of employees’ social
contributions on low wage. Hence we observe again a shift from tax policies
towards social security policies. The practical argument, which has been
used when abolishing the tax credit, was that its eﬀect is only felt 2 years
afterwards. However, this practical disadvantage could have been solved
by integrating the tax credit into the monthly withholding tax. We assume
that the reasons behind this strategy are more related to the position of
trade unions. They have an interest in managing the issue of the unem-
ployment trap through social security (being in their power) and not
through taxation.
The reduction of taxes and of the employees’ social contributions have
substantially reduced the tax burden on wages, in particular for the
lowest (minimum) wages. For couple breadwinners working at minimum
wage, the employees’ tax burden remains very small (see Table 3.1).
More detailed calculations reveal that employee social contributions
decreased from 13 per cent to 6 per cent. This ﬁgure does not yet include
the impact of the recent reforms on the workbonus. The margin for reduc-
tion with regards to taxes is still larger than that with regards to social
contributions.
Tax-beneﬁt calculations on ‘typical households’ show that the total
package of reforms introduced in Belgium since 2000 has had an impact on
the net replacement rates for low-wage earners (see Table 3.2). After the
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reforms, lone parents no longer lose money in the transition from maxi-
mum unemployment beneﬁt to full-time minimum wage. However, net
replacement rates for lone parents and couple breadwinners remain
high (90 per cent or more). Women who are living with an (earning) partner
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Table 3.2 Net disposable household income for long-term unemployed with
a maximum unemployment beneﬁt in % of net disposable
household income in minimum wage work, Belgium (worst case
scenario), 1999–2003 (1 January)
Full-time minimum wage Half-time minimum wage
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Maximum unemployment beneﬁt
Single 71 69 71 83 81 85 82 83 89 86
Lone parent 2 children 104 96 96 99 97 92 86 86 88 88
Couple breadwinner 91 88 87 90 90 88 86 86 87 86
2 children
Married partner (second 85 82 81 81 73 96 94 94 94 83
partner working),
2 children
Notes: Simulated reforms (Reduction of employees’ social contributions, tax credit, work-
related ‘back-to-work bonuses’ and childcare costs).
Source: Centre for Social Policy, STASIM (Tax-beneﬁt Model).
Table 3.1 The burden of taxes and social contributions as a % of gross
wages, Belgium 1992–2003
1992 1999 2001 2003
Minimum wage
Single 27 29 24 21
One parent 2 children 19 19 15 12
Couple breadwinner 2 children 13 13 8 5
Average wage (1)
Single 39 42 41 40
One parent 35 37 37 36
Couple breadwinner 29 31 30 29
Note: (1) The average wage (approx. €30, 425 gross annual wage) is about 200% of the
minimum wage.
Source: Centre for Social Policy, STASIM (Tax-Beneﬁt Model).
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(so-called cohabitees) and enjoying a ﬂat rate beneﬁt when long-term
unemployed, see a rise in the net proﬁt of work compared to unemploy-
ment. Single people however are facing an increase in net-replacement
rates, but their replacement rates were one of the lowest by the end of the
1990s. The rise in replacement rates for single people can be explained by
the fact that unemployment beneﬁt levels were increased simultaneously
with increasing the net incomes from work. Contrary to the other unem-
ployment categories, single people experienced a stronger rise in beneﬁt
levels which exceeded the rise in net income from work.
4 LOW WAGE TAX CREDITS IN BELGIUM, THE US
AND THE UK
In this section we present a brief description of the Belgian Low Wage Tax
Credit (LWTC), the American EITC and the British WTC. We also discuss
some ﬁndings in the literature with respect to the impact of the tax credits
on employment, poverty and income mobility.7 In Table 3.3 the precise
functioning, conditions and amounts of the LWTC, the EITC and the
WTC are presented for income year 2003.
4.1 The Low Wage Tax Credit in Belgium
Compared to other countries the Belgian tax credit is atypical, as it is
granted to low earning individuals and not to families with a low labour
income. Consequently, the tax credit is more universal than the American
and British counterpart. Eligible low wage earners should earn a yearly
(taxable) wage of no less than €3,850 and no more than €16,690. The
maximum yearly amount in basic tax credit is €520 (incremental introduc-
tion of €78 in 2002, €266 in 2003 and €440 in 2004). The amount of the tax
credit increases as a function of net taxable earned income (phased in) until
it reaches a maximum level (plateau) and then decreases again from a
certain level of earned income onwards (phase-out). A phase-in of 40 per
cent means that an extra earned Euro increases net income with €1.40,
whereas a phase-out of 40 per cent implies that net income increases with
€0.60. The cost has been estimated at €450 million (Valenduc, 2002).
Criteria such as numbers of hours worked, number of children or childcare
costs are not taken into account.
Impact on labour supply
The Belgian LWTC is considered to be too modest to have a decisive impact
to accept a low paid regular job (Marx, 2001). Valenduc (2002) also
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arrives at the conclusion that because of its universal and straightforward
character the eﬀectiveness of the tax credit as a labour supply incentive is
weakened.
Impact on income mobility
As the Belgian tax credit is granted on an individual base, it is far less con-
fronted with a low wage trap for two-earners than the Anglo-Saxon ver-
sions. Due to this individual grant, Belgian two-earners are slower to reach
the phase-out as Anglo-Saxons are. Consequently, two-earners in Belgium
are less restricted to climb up the income ladder through training or pro-
motion to higher wage level.
Impact on poverty
From the perspective of poverty alleviation it is very important whether the
subsidy is granted to individuals or to families. Cantillon et al (2003) show
that the LWTC goes relatively more to the middle and higher regions of the
welfare distribution. This broader spread is again related to the fact that the
tax credit is granted on an individual basis and that family income capac-
ity is not taken into account. Apparently, two-earner families beneﬁt most
from the refundable tax credit. As the level is very modest, the impact on
poverty is very limited.
4.2 The US EITC
The EITC was introduced in 1975 in the US as an exemption of social
insurance contributions for poor working families with children. The
system has been extended and reformed repeatedly. After 1993, the
amounts of the tax credit have been increased systematically. Since 2002 a
few (minor) reforms have taken place, such as the simpliﬁcation of the
rules for determining labour income (Centre On Budget and Policy
Priorities, 2004). The level of the refundable tax credit depends on net
taxable household earned income, and is thus granted at the family level.
At present cohabiting couples are still treated as two singles, which means
that they can qualify for EITC on the basis of their individual income.
Eligible low wage earners should earn a yearly income of no more than
€9,290 (without children) and €28,700 (two or more children). The
maximum level of the tax credit varies between €316 (singles) and €3,478
(two or more children) (these are ﬁgures for 2003). There is a phase-in, a
plateau and a phase-out. The EITC is more generous for families with
more children. The tax credit has to be requested, so it is not granted auto-
matically. Take-up is rather high (75–90 per cent), which indicates that
EITC is not really stigmatizing. The EITC is paid as a once-only amount
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at the end of the year, though the possibility for prepayments exists
(Internal Revenue Services, 2003).
Impact on labour supply
Geoﬀrey (2003) has shown that the EITC has delivered an important con-
tribution to the recent increase in employment in the US. The EITC was
designed to increase labour participation of single mothers, and this has
been realized to a large extent after the increase of the amounts in 1993.
The transition from unemployment to work (at a minimum wage) is in
general favourable. Only for the second earning partner in the household
the eﬀect can be (slightly) negative. Married couples are situated quite often
in the phase-out, which makes it less interesting for the second partner to
work or to work more (eg switch from a part-time to a full-time job). The
overall net eﬀect of EITC on the number of hours worked is said to be posi-
tive. The extent to which this relates to economic growth and job growth,
remains unclear (Cauthen, 2002).
Impact on income mobility
Families in the phase-out (often couples) can face the problem of the low
wage trap. This means that there is no incentive to climb up the ladder
through training or promotion to a higher wage level. Families in the phase-
out often face high marginal eﬀective tax rates. Apart from being a social and
an economic problem, containing upward income mobility is also a problem
of political legitimacy (Burman, 2003; Marx, 2001). A ﬂatter phase-out can
temper the eﬀect of the low wage trap to a large extent. The US EITC is the
ﬂattest tax credit of the three, which makes it of course more costly.
Impact on poverty
Sixty per cent of EITC payments go to incomes below the poverty thresh-
old. The American Census Bureau estimates that the EITC has kept 4.3
million Americans in 1997 out of poverty. The decline of poverty among
children of single parents is especially remarkable. The ratio of net earned
income to the poverty line increased from 0.93 in 1993 to 1.06 in 1997. Very
poor working families beneﬁt less from the tax credit, but for this group the
tax credit also decreases the poverty gap. For women who lose their social
assistance and cannot ﬁnd a job, the situation remains problematic
(Cauthen, 2002; Marx, 2000).
4.3 The Working Tax Credit in the UK
The WTC or ETC (Employment Tax Credit) is a reform and merged ele-
ments of the former Working Family Tax Credit (WFTC) and Disabled
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Persons Tax Credit (DPTC). The WFTC originated from the former
Family Credit (FC). The WTC, introduced in 2003, is mainly an exten-
sion of WFTC. Contrary to the WFTC, families and individuals with-
out children or handicapped persons now also qualify for the credit
(Brewer, 2003). The WTC is also more generous and administratively
simpler than the WFTC. The amount of the tax credit can now be
changed throughout the year when conditions of the beneﬁciary change
(eg changes in earned income, number of hours worked). The thresholds
for granting a tax credit are now determined on the basis of gross
joint taxable income (ie before deduction of work expenses and social
contributions) instead of on net taxable earned income. This change
was introduced to improve the incentives for two-earners (Inland
Revenue, 2002). As in the EITC, the WTC depends on household labour
income. In this way two-earners are not favoured compared to one-
earners.
Married and cohabiting couples are treated in the same way. Eligible
low wage earners should earn a yearly income of no more than €16,459
(without children) and €22 605 (with children). The maximum level of the
tax credit varies between €2,312 (singles) and €4,586 (lone parent or couple)
(ﬁgures are for 2003). Apart from income from work, number of hours
worked and childcare costs are also relevant criteria for determining the
level of the tax credit. The number of hours criterion is heavily criticized
because it is not always straightforward to determine an average number of
hours worked per week. By including childcare costs the working-life
balance is also taken into account, as these costs are often a barrier for low
pay individuals to take up a job. There is no phase-in, only a phase-out
(Inland Revenue, 2002; Brewer et al, 2001). The credit is paid out as an
addition to wages in order to enhance the link between the credit and
employment. However, this can feel more stigmatizing than a once only
yearly payment because the tax credit appears on the pay slip every month
(Brewer et al, 2001).
Impact on labour supply
According to simulations of the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) the net
eﬀect of the WTC on labour supply is positive (Brewer, 2003). For non-
working persons the transition to employment is positive. However, there
is little incentive to work more hours, especially for couples, which reduces
the employment eﬀect. These simulations give thus similar results as the US
EITC. British policy (just as the American tax credit) mainly wants to
have at least one person working in each household (Joseph Rowntree
Foundation, 2001).
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Impact on income mobility
Just as EITC, the WTC puts a restraint on income mobility. The phase-out
of WTC is less ﬂat than the American measure, which causes a bigger low
wage trap problem than with EITC (Burman, 2003; Marx, 2001).
Impact on poverty
Few empirical data are available on the impact of the former WFTC on
poverty and welfare. It was assumed however that the redistributive impact
of WFTC would be larger than its employment eﬀect (Marx, 2001). Recent
simulations of the IFS with respect to the WTC indicate that households
with children at the bottom of the distribution have the relatively strongest
reduction of the marginal tax rate, whereas families in the three highest
deciles lose considerably because of the means test. Compared to single
earners, two-earners are the main losers. The simulations show that 1.6
million families have a higher eﬀective marginal tax rate, against 2.4 million
that see a decrease of their tax rate. The extension of the WTC to families
without children or handicapped persons is, according to the IFS, not
eﬀective as a poverty reducing strategy, as these groups are often not at risk
of poverty (Brewer, 2003).
5 METHODOLOGY
For evaluating the Belgian LWTC, we have used a tax-beneﬁt standard
simulation model (STASIM), which was developed by the Centre for Social
Policy at the University of Antwerp. The STASIM calculates gross-net
income trajectories for standard families on beneﬁt and on work income in
Belgium (for the assumptions in STASIM, see Appendix 3.1). With
STASIM we have simulated the Belgian, British and American tax credit
schemes on hypothetical family types and wages. This methodology has
advantages and disadvantages (De Lathouwer, 2004):
Advantages:
– The great advantage of standard simulations is that the mutual con-
nections between communicating institutional rules can be clariﬁed.
It is thus possible to control and clearly demarcate the diﬀerent vari-
ables used.
– Policy eﬀorts can be evaluated from diﬀerent perspectives. It is thus
possible to relate simulated net household income (in work or in
unemployment) to poverty lines and to relate income from work to
income from social beneﬁts.
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Disadvantages:
– Standard simulations put emphasis on the ﬁnancial aspects of work
and beneﬁt dependency. Non-ﬁnancial elements however, can also
play an important role in the trade-oﬀ between work and non-work
(availability of childcare, job quality, preferences for autonomous
time, etc).
– As we use hypothetical family types, the results only apply for these
types and are not necessarily representative for the population.
– Net disposable income and replacement ratios present only a static
picture. Long term ﬁnancial consequences (eg through promotion)
cannot be taken into account.
We have performed calculations for six typical households: a single, a
breadwinner couple (ie with one income) and a two-income couple, and this
each time for no and for two children in the family. We have simulated the
transition from long-term unemployment to employment for various wage
levels (100, 110, 120, 150 and 200 per cent of the guaranteed average
minimum monthly income (GAMMI)). We assume that the unemployed
receive the maximum unemployment allowance. This worst case scenario
reveals the maximum potential unemployment traps.
In our simulations we have calculated the gross-net trajectories for the
three tax credit schemes in a Belgian context. This means that we start from
the Belgian tax-beneﬁt system, in which we introduce ceteris paribus the
British and the American tax credit. Table 3.3 gives the various assump-
tions that are made in the simulation of the various tax credit schemes for
the income year 2003. A more detailed explanation is given in Appendix
3.1. Amounts are on a yearly basis and in Euros.8 In order to calculate the
‘net impact’ of the tax credit schemes, we also simulated a scenario without
a tax credit (the default scenario).
We have calculated the following indicators to evaluate and compare the
three tax credits:
– the level of the monthly tax credit (in Euros per month);
– the total extra net revenue, ie the ﬁnancial gain per month when
changing from unemployment to part-time or full-time employment
(in Euros per month);
– the labour surplus ratio, ie the ratio of employment income to income
from unemployment;
– the ‘poverty line ratio’, the ratio of total net income at the household
level to the poverty line.
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6 RESULTS
6.1 Level of the Tax Credits
In Figures 3.1 (a) and (b) and 3.2 (a) and (b) we compare the level of the
diﬀerent tax credits in Euros per month. Figure 3.1 gives the tax credit enti-
tlement for the transition from unemployment (receiving a maximum
unemployment beneﬁt) to full-time employment, whereas Figure 3.2 shows
the eﬀect of the transition to part-time work. What is most striking is the
marked diﬀerence in the proﬁle of the Belgian tax credit compared to its
Anglo-Saxon counterparts. In almost all circumstances the Belgian system
grants a very small beneﬁt: the highest amount is around €55 per month
(for a couple with 2 incomes). Families with and without children receive
the same amount, illustrating clearly that the Belgian credit is not
speciﬁcally targeted at families with children. It also shows that it is not
family dependent but granted on the basis of individual income; couples
with two incomes can also beneﬁt. This contrasts with the Anglo-Saxon
measures which clearly and strongly favour families with single earners.
Breadwinner couples and couples with two children for example receive
€274 per month according to the American method, which is ﬁve times
more than under the Belgian regime. With EITC and WTC, two income
households can hardly beneﬁt from the measures because of the joint
income test. The American and British credits are mainly beneﬁcial to fam-
ilies with children (except two-earner couples). Families without children
are entitled to only small amounts.
With the transition to full-time employment the tax credit is always situ-
ated in the phase-out for the three calculation methods. This can be seen
from the decreasing trend of the amounts with increasing wage level. The
ﬁgures also show clearly that the US tax credit is reduced at a slower pace
than the British and the Belgian credit. According to EITC a single parent
with two children receives an amount of €260 per month at minimum wage
level, and €245 at 110 per cent of GAMMI. With WTC this is €253 and
€209, respectively.
The Belgian and the American tax credit are higher for part-time
employment than for full-time employment. This low wage trap is avoided
with the WTC through the bonus granted for full-time employment. With
the transition to part-time employment the Belgian tax credit is at its
maximum level (plateau), namely €43.33 per month, because earned
income is now low enough (see Figure 3.1b). For two-earner couples the
amount is 56 Euro, because the other partner has a labour income that
opens rights to a tax credit. According to EITC calculations the phase-in,
the plateau and the phase-out can be distinguished, depending on the
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Note: B  Belgian LWTC; US  EITC; UK  WTC
Source: Own calculations with STASIM.
Figure 3.1 Level of the total monthly tax credit for low wages
(€/household) for diﬀerent income levels by the transition from
long-term unemployment (minimum and maximum
unemployment allowance) to full-time employment
(Belgium 2003)
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Notes: B  Belgian LWTC; US  EITC; UK  WTC.
Source: Own calculations with STASIM.
Figure 3.2 Level of the total monthly tax credit for low wages
(€/household) for diﬀerent income levels by the transition from
long-term unemployment (maximum unemployment
allowance) to part-time employment (Belgium 2003)
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family type. With the WTC calculation the tax credit is always in the phase-
out (remember that WTC has no phase-in). In the UK the phase-out is
already applicable for a joint labour income of 7671 Euro per month. The
ﬁgures also show clearly that in the UK all families without children and a
part-time job do not qualify for WTC.
In the rest of this chapter we focus on the transition from unemployment
to full-time employment, in order to concentrate better on the eﬀects of the
tax credit. In the transition to part-time employment, other factors also
play a role (such as the guaranteed income beneﬁt9), which fall outside the
scope of this chapter.
6.2 Total Extra Net Revenue
Our second indicator is the total extra net revenue a household receives
per month when switching from unemployment to full employment.
The extra revenue from work is not only determined by the tax credit, but
also by other factors – the level of the earned wage, the diﬀerences in taxes
and contributions between income from work and income from beneﬁt,
the loss of the unemployment beneﬁt and of other social allowances
for beneﬁt entitled persons, which do not exist for persons in work and
ﬁnally by extra work expenses, such as childcare and transportation
When there are no children, there are only very small diﬀerences in total
extra net revenue between the three systems (see Figure 3.3 (a) and (b)).
This is of course due to the low amounts of the tax credits for these types,
such the tax credit is only a small proportion of their extra revenue. Only
for breadwinner couples without children does the UK tax credit provide a
considerable gain. The presence of children changes the situation, espe-
cially in the case of single earners, both lone parents and couples. These two
family types gain most with the US tax credit, but the UK-measure also
provides a considerable extra revenue for lone parents and breadwinners
with a low income. Two-earners with children beneﬁt most from a Belgian
tax credit.
Total extra net revenue in absolute terms increases with wage level
according to the three calculation methods. Only with the WTC method is
the upward mobility restrained for single parents with two children: start-
ing from a maximum unemployment allowance they have a surplus of only
€241 per month at 150 per cent of GAMMI against €290 at 110 per cent.
This low-wage trap follows from the fact that at the 150 per cent level the
lone parent is not entitled any more to a tax credit as its income has
surpassed the upper limit (cf. Figure 3.1 and Table 3.3).
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Notes: no TC no tax credit; B  LWTC; US  EITC; UK  WTC.
Source: Own calculations with STASIM.
Figure 3.3 Total monthly extra net revenue (€/household) for various
income levels by the transition from long-term unemployment
(maximum unemployment allowance) to full-time employment
(Belgium 2003)
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6.3 Labour Surplus Ratios
The standard indicator in literature for measuring the diﬀerence between
non-work and work is the net replacement ratio (OECD, 2004a). We
present here the inverse of the net replacement ratio, ie the labour surplus
ratio, which is the ratio of employment income to income at unemploy-
ment. This indicator presents more clearly what one gains relatively in
moving from unemployment to employment.
The ﬁrst bar of each cluster in Figures 3.4 (a) and (b) represents the
labour surplus ratio in the assumption that no tax credit is granted in the
transition from unemployment to work. An increase in the labour surplus
ratio following from the introduction of a tax credit thus indicates that this
credit has a positive inﬂuence in the ﬁght against unemployment traps.
It is striking that the labour surplus ratios for single parents with children
in the case of transition from a maximum unemployment allowance are
rather close to 100 per cent for wage levels between 100 per cent and 120 per
cent of minimum wage when the Belgian method is used. This means that
there is no net gain at all from work. Surplus ratios below 110 per cent
(a choice which is of course arbitrary) can be considered as problematic, as
there is quasi no ﬁnancial added value from work. Using EITC and WTC,
these ratios climb to higher levels (around 120), what can be considered as an
improvement for ﬁghting the unemployment trap. Surplus ratios for singles
and two-earners are in general highest with the Belgian tax credit. For bread-
winners without children the British method scores best, and for breadwin-
ners with children the American method results in the highest ratios.
Surprisingly, we ﬁnd that for two earner couples the labour surplus ratios
with the UK tax credit are lower than in the ‘no tax credit scenario’. This
is also when the US system is applied for two earners with children. The
reason for these counter-intuitive results can be found in the joint income
test of these systems: when the individual is unemployed but his partner
works, then this couple can be entitled to a tax credit because of employ-
ment income from the partner. When the unemployed individual switches
to work, then this couple can lose this high tax credit, thus being worse oﬀ
than in the ‘no tax credit scenario’.
6.4 Ratio of Total Net Household Income to EU Poverty Line
Our last indicator is the poverty line ratio, which is the ratio of total
net income at the household level to the poverty line. We have used here
60 per cent of median income as poverty line, derived from the data of the
Socio-Economic Panel. A ratio below 100 per cent indicates that household
income is not suﬃcient to rise above the poverty line, and thus the
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Notes: B  LWTC; US  EITC; UK  WTC.
Source: Own calculations with STASIM.
Figure 3.4 Labour surplus ratio for various income levels by the transition
from long-term unemployment (maximum unemployment
allowance) to full-time employment (Belgium 2003)
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household can be considered as ‘poor’. The ﬁrst bar of each cluster in
Figure 3.5 (a) and (b) gives the poverty line ratios in the absence of a tax
credit. Increases in the ratio (compared to the ‘no tax credit’ scenario) point
to a beneﬁcial inﬂuence of the tax credit.
When long-term unemployed at a maximum allowance, breadwinners
with children are poor (with a ratio of 96 per cent). Couple breadwinners
without children are also very close to the poverty line. All other family
types are not living in ﬁnancial poverty. Employment – with or without a
tax credit – improves everybody’s situation. Families without children
improve their situation more than those with two children (as the poverty
line is lower in the absence of children). For some family types, the tax
credit consists of a major improvement. This is the case for single earners
with children when one of the Anglo-Saxon credits is applied, which
already became apparent in our discussion of the other indicators. A bread-
winner couple without children improves its poverty situation mostly with
WTC (139 per cent for minimum wage level against 120 per cent for the
Belgian measure). One-earners with children improve their situation
mostly through EITC (121 per cent of minimum wage against 108 per cent
for LWTC).
7 CONCLUSION
The disappointing performance of the Belgian labour market and the issue
of the sustainability of the welfare state resulted in the 1990s in a more
explicit discourse on beneﬁt and employment policies. A consensus was
reached that beneﬁt dependency needed to be reduced urgently, but without
increasing poverty. Dependency reduction is desirable both from an eco-
nomic perspective (pressures on sustainability of the system, in particularly
due to population ageing) and from the perspective of the legitimacy of the
welfare state. Moreover, the EU Employment Strategy has put considerable
pressure on European governments to increase their employment rates and
to reach an agreement on employment-friendly reforms of social security
and taxation. With the employment guideline of an average employment
rate of 70 per cent Belgium is still far removed from this objective, given an
employment rate of 60 per cent of the population aged 15–64 years.
One of the most recent measures to encourage individuals to take up a
job is the LWTC, which was introduced in 2002 as a part of the Belgian per-
sonal income tax reform of 2001. As we have previously discussed in this
chapter, the tax credit was only one of the MWP policies in Belgium. This
tax credit was inspired by similar measures in the UK and the US. A tax
credit for low wages has two goals. One is to cure the high degree of beneﬁt
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Notes: B  LWTC; US  EITC; UK  WTC.
Source: Own calculations with STASIM.
Figure 3.5 Poverty line ratio for various income levels by the transition
from long-term unemployment (maximum unemployment
allowance) to full-time employment (Belgium 2003)
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dependency of certain segments of the population by providing a work
incentive (even in countries with a strong job growth and a low unemploy-
ment level). A second goal is to increase disposable income of the working
poor.
It is no coincidence that tax credits originated in the Anglo-Saxon
welfare states, where a high incidence of low pay jobs and large income
diﬀerences created a need for supplementary incomes to work. High wage
inequality has also forced tax credits to be targeted more severely towards
the most needy in order to reduce costs. Compared to tax credits such as
the WTC in the UK and the EITC in the US, the Belgian basic tax credit is
individualized. An individual tax credit is more costly than a family-based
one, as more people will be eligible. In Belgium this was traded-oﬀ against
lower beneﬁt levels (€520 compared to €4,500 under WTC) and lower
earned income threshold levels (around €17,000 in Belgium compared to
€30,000 under EITC). Consequently the impact on ﬁnancial incentives and
on working poverty (although very limited in Belgium) is much smaller
than with the Anglo-Saxon tax credit schemes.
The evaluation of the Belgian tax credit also learns that the legitimacy of
in-work beneﬁts through tax policy is very limited up till now. The Belgian
tax credit scheme only survived 2 years! In-work beneﬁts have been moved
back entirely to the ﬁeld of social security. At this moment it is not clear if
the Belgian tax credit should be considered as an ‘accident du parcours’ or
as the beginning of a structural change in social policies using taxation
tools more explicitly as redistribution instruments. As the reduction of
social contributions to ﬁght unemployment traps will reach its limits in the
near future – the margin after the introduction of the workbonus has
become very small – the question remains if and when tax credits will
become an important redistribution policy instrument following the
example of liberal welfare states in continental welfare states.
APPENDIX
Appendix 3.1 STASIM: the STAndard SImulation Model for Belgium
1 Assumptions made in STASIM for the transition from unemployment
to work
Standard simulations start from a large number of assumptions, which
have to be kept in mind when interpreting the results (De Lathouwer, 2001):
– In STASIM, simulations are made over a number of social security
sector and personal income taxes for the period 1989–2003 (1 January
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of each year). We assume that the situations (legislation, family, activ-
ities, income) remain constant throughout the year.
– We depart from six standard family types (single, couple one-earners
with and without children, couple two-earners with and without chil-
dren and single parent with children). The family types with children
have standard two children, one younger than 3 years and one aged
6 years. In the situation of a working single parent or two-earners in
a couple we assume that there is out-door childcare for the youngest
child. For each family type with a partner one can choose in the sim-
ulation if it is a married or a cohabiting couple. A working partner in
the family is always full-time employed at a gross wage of 130 per cent
of the guaranteed average minimum monthly income (GAMMI).
– The calculations start from long-term unemployment and look at the
ﬁnancial extra income resulting from the transition to work for a wide
range of wage levels, starting from the interprofessional minimum
wage (for an employee of minimum 22 years and 1 year seniority) and
ranging to 200 per cent of the minimum wage.
– The calculations do not include elderly unemployed. This group is in
some circumstances entitled to higher beneﬁts, and thus ﬁnancial
traps are considerably higher for them.
– Calculations are made for various family types and on a yearly basis.
Amounts apply for 1 January and are extrapolated over an entire year.
We hereby assume immediate settling of all ﬁscal and other eﬀects.
These are strong simpliﬁcations, as in reality some income sources are
not paid out immediately (eg holiday pay) and ﬁnal tax liability is only
known at the ﬁnal settlement one year later.
– In the case of unemployment, account is taken of replacement
incomes (unemployment allowance) on the one hand and supple-
mentary beneﬁts on the other (increased child beneﬁts, the guaran-
teed income beneﬁt).
– Childcare costs are taken into account and used in the tax calculation
for single parents and couples with children with both partners
working. We have used the parent childcare contributions according
to the scales of ‘Kind en Gezin’. No account is taken of other ‘in-
work’ costs such as commuting or purchasing clothing or a car.
2 Assumptions for translating the tax credit rules in STASIM
The Belgian low wage tax credit
In the personal income tax module net taxable professional income10 is
equated to activity income (cf. Table 3.3). Net taxable professional income
is here equal to gross taxable professional income minus ﬁxed professional
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expenses and social insurance contributions. We have used the indexed
amounts and income limits presented in Table 3.3. We assume that there are
no other income sources (eg from ﬁnancial assets or real estate). For the
income year 2003 we have used the tax credit at cruising speed (ie maximum
indexed amount of €520) in order to make a better comparison with the
Anglo-Saxon credits that have a much longer tradition. The tax credit is, as
prescribed, determined at an individual level and before application of the
marital quotient.11 It is settled with personal income taxes and refunded if
it exceeds personal taxes with more than €2.5.
The earned income tax credit
The concept of earned income is equated to net taxable professional
income (cf. supra) in the Belgian system. Contrary to the Belgian tax credit,
EITC is granted on the basis of joint taxable professional income.
Cohabiting couples however are treated as two singles; in this case children
are assigned to the partner with highest earnings. The ‘adjusted gross
income’ condition is not used, as the various deductions (eg maintenance
payments) do not apply in STASIM. The ‘investment income’ is also not
applicable in STASIM. We assume that all the other conditions mentioned
in Table 3.1 (eg social security number) are fulﬁlled. We have used the
amounts that apply for income year 2003 and converted them into Euros
(€1  $1.20879, exchange rate in April 2004).
The working tax credit
The income limits of WTC are based on gross taxable professional income
(ie before deduction of work expenses and social contributions). As with
the American method the credit is calculated on the basis of joint income.
So for all couples (also cohabiting) professional incomes have been added
up. No account is taken of those aged 50 and handicapped bonuses, as
they are not used in STASIM. All other conditions have been transferred.
The indexed amounts have been applied for income year 2003 and con-
verted in Euros (€1  £0.659645; exchange rate on 8 April 2004).
NOTES
1. We are very grateful to Kristel Bogaerts for her valuable support for the calculations pre-
sented in this chapter.
2. For example the proportion of minimum income on median earned income for full-time
employees.
3. For example the ratio of income at unemployment to income at employment.
4. ’Making work pay’ policies are not conﬁned to the tax-beneﬁt system. Childcare costs
are often the most substantial in-work expense and they are commonly identiﬁed as a
barrier to taking up employment, in particular for low-income households (OECD,
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1996). In 2002, childcare was reformed in Belgium in Flanders, resulting in a signiﬁcant
decrease in childcare costs for lower income groups, while higher income groups are now
paying more. The reform was intended to be budget neutral. It meant, for example, that
childcare costs for a lone-parent family with two (small) children working at minimum
wage were reduced by half, thus making low-paid work ﬁnancially more rewarding.
Besides reducing the ﬁnancial cost, the government also increased the number of public
childcare day centers and stimulated private childcare services, eg by improving the
social-protection status of this group.
5. Besides this general policy, a number of selective ‘back-to-work bonuses’ have been
introduced since 2000, albeit under very restrictive entitlement conditions. Measures
have been launched to reduce speciﬁc work-related costs for unemployed persons
making the transition to work. Lump-sum annual bonuses were introduced in unem-
ployment insurance to partly compensate for childcare costs (only for lone-parent house-
holds) and mobility costs for unemployed persons who have taken up work. The number
of beneﬁciaries under these latter measures is, however, still extremely low (in 2001, only
41 persons received the mobility bonus and 79 claimed the childcare cost bonus). In add-
ition to the aforementioned measures, certain selective beneﬁts for the long-term unem-
ployed (eg increased child beneﬁt) can now be temporarily retained after re-employment.
6. These were also made refundable in the 2001 reform.
7. Another possible eﬀect of a tax credit is the impact on the wage level: a low wage tax
credit could cause a wage erosion at the bottom of the labour market. Employers may
be inclined to pay lower wages when they know that their low pay workers will be subsi-
dized by the government. Employees may also accept lower wages when they know that
the government will compensate the diﬀerence. The OECD thinks that wage erosion can
be avoided by combining wage subsidies with an increase of minimum wages. The US
has increased the level of its tax credit together with its minimum wages. Up until now
a possible downward pressure on wages has not been empirically conﬁrmed (Cauthen,
2002; Marx, 2001). Therefore we do not treat this aspect in our discussion of the respec-
tive tax credits.
8. For calculating the EITC and WTC amounts to Euros we have used the exchange rates
applicable on 8 April 2004.
9. The guaranteed-income beneﬁt is a beneﬁt one receives on top of earned income and
whose level varies in function of the previous unemployment allowance.
10. With part-time employment the guaranteed-income beneﬁt can be granted. This is also
applied for the American and British calculation method of the tax credit.
11. The tax credit calculations according to the American and the British method also use
income before application of the marital quotient.
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